If at first you don't succeed; call it version 1.0
Friday, October 10, 2008

You all learned about the value of sharing. When I was a kid my mother taught me that I should share my stuff with my friends. Unfortunately, sharing is not always a good thing. Especially, when talking about sharing web-applications across domains.

Over six months ago I've discovered an interesting, yet troubling, issue - Google.com suffers from a cross-domain web-application sharing security design flaw. There are several Google web applications which are accessible over multiple google.com subdomains. The following are some of those web-applications and subdomains:

  • Google Maps (maps.google.com)
  • Google Mail (mail.google.com)
  • Google Images (images.google.com)
  • Google News (news.google.com)
  • Google.com (Google Search, Google Accounts, Google Apps, Google History, etc.)

Here's example of Google News being hosted on the Google Maps subdomain: http://maps.google.com/news?sa=N&tab=ln

googlenewsmaps

 

So, what's the problem with that, you ask? Well, there are several ways this cross-domain web-application sharing security design flaw can be exploited. For instance, one small XSS issue in Google Maps can now be exploited to hijack Google, GMail or Google Apps accounts, by bypassing the browser's Same Origin Policy. There were several XSS issues reported in the past, on some of the google.com subdomains, which are now fixed.

Furthermore, as shown by Adrian Pastor of the GNUCitizen team, it is also possible to abuse features of one of Google's web-application and then impersonate to an other. Adrian's proof-of-concept exploits a frame injection vulnerability in Google Images to inject a fake GMail login page. It then uses the cross-domain web-application sharing flaw to further convince the victim that this is a legitimate login page, from the legitimate mail.google.com subdomain.

gmailimages

 

I've notified Google about this issue several days after I discovered it, back in April. Their initial response was that they were looking into it. Today, after not getting any further response from the Google security team about this issue, and after Adrian published his proof-of-concept, I've decided to reveal this information in a hope that this security design flaw will be fixed by Google as soon as possible.


Friday, October 10, 2008 1:03:06 PM UTC | Comments [1] | Security#
Thursday, October 23, 2008 10:53:31 PM UTC
Since April, huh? The Lesson of it: Full Disclosure after 1 or 2 week(s).
Comments are closed.     
Send me an Email
Follow me on Twitter
RSS Feeds
  
Blogroll
Archive
Admin Login
Sign In
Disclaimer
The opinions expressed herein are my own personal opinions and do not represent my employer's view in anyway.