If at first you don't succeed; call it version 1.0
Thursday, 22 May 2008

During the past 2 weeks I got tons of questions regarding the 0day treasure hunt and the vulnerability itself. In order to make things more clear and understandable, I've compiled a list of answers for several frequently asked questions.

 

Q: Why do you involve politics and security?

A: I see nothing politic in celebrating my country's independence day. I'm sure you all do the same in your own country. We also play this treasure hunt game during the Passover holiday, but I thought it will more suite independence day this year. Maybe next year I'll do it earlier in Passover.

 

Q: Can you explain the clues? I'm not sure how they fit with the 0day treasure.

A: Sure. You can find the clues here. I'll explain each of them by their number.

  1. Obviously, the vulnerability affects Internet Explorer 7.0 and 8.0 beta. According to Secunia it also affects IE6.
  2. In order to exploit the vulnerability the user must interact with the exploit by printing the webpage and enabling the "Print Table of Links" option.
  3. The proof-of-concept code was embedded in all of the pages of the blog.
  4. The proof-of-concept was hidden as a "tracking" script that was dynamically generated in order to generate a link. This script used XMLHttpRequest to get a page that returned the main page of the blog, but with a 404 (File Not Found) status code.
  5. Acidus wrote in a blog post about the Phishing hole I found a year ago in IE7. Both vulnerabilities are within Internet Explorer "local resources". Acidus was right in that I then said that only most of the local resources are running in "Internet Zone". The 0day vulnerability is within a local resource which runs in "Local Machine Zone".
  6. Anchor = HTML anchor (<a> tag) = link. What else can you do with a link? Print it.. (I did say think "out of the box")
  7. Charles Babbage is the inventor of the printer.
  8. This screenshot is of the actual vulnerable code in the local resource script. One line of code is needed to be fixed here.
  9. First video: Print. Second video: Table. Third video: Links. ===> Print Table of Links. Simple as that.

 

Q: How critical is this vulnerability anyway?

A: Well, it depends. As this vulnerability requires user interaction in order to be exploited, it will surely not be used in a worm scenario. However, it still highly possible to be used in several other attack scenarios. For example, an attacker can add malicious links to massively printed user generated websites (e.g. Wikipedia, technical forums, blogs, etc.) and just wait for the victims to print those pages with the "print table of links" option (usually used to print a "references" appendix).

 

Q: So if that's the case, why haven't you waited a reasonable time to let Microsoft patch this vulnerability?

A: I've had bad past experience with Microsoft's response time. The last time I used their "responsible disclosure" policy, I had to wait 6 months for them to fix a one line of code in a non core component. As I've already showed, this 0day vulnerability also requires one line of code to be fixed, and I'm sure no one wants to wait 6 months for it to fix. Past experience also shows that Full Disclosure can help in getting a quicker fix. I usually do provide enough time for a vendor to fix a vulnerability.

 

Q: My security product (Anti-Virus/IPS/IDS) says that it detects this vulnerability. Am I safe to print pages with links?

A: Not necessarily. Even though several AV products have already added a signature to the proof-of-concept I provided (see Figure 1), they only protect you against this specific proof-of-concept. How do I know? Very simple, I just changed the proof-of-concept a little bit (the proof-of-concept still executes Windows Calculator), and tested against VirusTotal again. This time no AV product could detect it (see Figure 2). You can test the new proof-of-concept yourself here. Anyway, you should really ignore the PR guys of the security companies who simply lie when they say that their product protects against this 0day vulnerability. It doesn't. In this case, it just try to protect you against executing Windows Calculator on your machine.

 

0day-faq-figure1         0day-faq-figure2

Figure 1 - Several AV detect the PoC              Figure 2 - No AV detect the slightly modified PoC


Thursday, 22 May 2008 17:09:28 UTC | Comments [0] | General | Security#
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The opinions expressed herein are my own personal opinions and do not represent my employer's view in anyway.